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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
UNDER STATUTES OF LIMITATION
JOSEPH S. Gi.L*
Any discussion of sovereignty and the statute of limitations neces-
sarily begins with the common law maxim nullum ternpus occurrit regi-
time does not obstruct the rights of the government. The basis of the
rule has generally been stated to be -that it is an incidental attribute of
sovereignty, necessary to protect the public against the negligence of its
servants. The maxim has survived in America, and any lawyer ap-
proaching a problem which concerns the State of Ohio can safely accept
as axiomatic the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the
State' unless the intention that they shall so run is obvious.
Because of the general application and acceptance of this rule, the
State has not been called upon to assert it directly in many litigated cases.
Since the Supreme Court of Ohio first announced that the common law
rule is applicable in Ohio,2 there have been only four cases in which the
decisions of that court have -turned upon its application. Two of those
cases' involved the school lands set aside by congress -to the legislature in
the so-called "French Grant"; and two4 involved the fee-simple title of
the State in the canal lands acquired under the Act of February 4, 1825.'
While the State has thus enjoyed a complete immunity from the
operation of the statute, that immunity has not been extended to its
subdivisions. It was held at an early date in the case of City of Cincinnati
v. First Presbyterian Church,6 that the immunity was an attribute of
sovereignty only, and did not extend to municipal corporations. This rule
was extended by later decisions which specifically held that neither town-
* First Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio.
1 The capitalized form of the word "State" is used advisedly in this context
and throughout this article. As will appear more fully below, the immunity of the
State has not been extended to its subdivisions, which in a non-specific sense per-
form "state" functions.
2 Monroe v. Lessee of Morris, 7 Ohio 262 (1835). This case did not involve
the State directly, but held that one asserting title to land against the record owner
under a claim of open, notorious, and adverse possession for a period of 21 years
could not consider that period of time which ran prior to a tax sale of the record
owner's interest. To hold otherwise, said the Court, would be to hold that the
statute could run against the State and that the purchases at the tax sale received
nothing, rather than the new and perfect title which the statute assured him.
3 Trustees of Green Township v. Campbell, et al., 16 Ohio St. 11 (1864);
Seeley v. Thomas, 31 Ohio St. 301 (1872).
4 Ohio ex rel. v. Railway Co., 53 Ohio St. 189 (1895); State of Ohio v.
Griftner, 61 Ohio St. 201, 55 N.E. 612 (1899).
5 23 Ohio Laws 50.
6 8 Ohio 298 (1838).
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ships' nor counties' shared in the State's immunity from the operation of
the statute.
The county case referred to above, Hlartman v. Hunter, Treasurer,9
held that an action brought by a county treasurer to recover certain ditch
assessments was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. This case
was distinguished only a year later by the decision in Wasteney v. Schott,
Treasurer,"0 involving an action by a county treasurer to recover per-
sonal property taxes which had become due more than six years previously.
The court held in the second case that the State was the real party inter-
ested in the recovery of the personal property taxes, and that the statute
of limitations was no bar to the action. This distinction has been recog-
nized in two lower court cases which were subsequently affirmed by the
supreme court," and apparently is still valid.
It has been stated by at least one author that "there is much con-
fusion and conflict in the cases in Ohio, as to whether statutes of
limitation apply to municipalities, or whether the immunity of the state
from -the operation of such statutes descends upon them."'" The problem
of arranging and classifying the cases involving municipal corporations
so as to ascertain the accuracy of that statement is beyond the scope of
this article. Those cases necessarily involve the law of adverse possession
and the substantive law governing municipal corporations. Since they
usually involve encroachments upon public property, they involve the law
of nuisances and the question of whether time can ever be a bar to the
abatement of a continuing nuisance. Each case must be analyzed to
determine whether the municipal corporation seeks to exercise rights in
a proprietary capacity or as the guardian of some right vested in the public.
And finally, as in all cases of adverse possession, the particular facts con-
cerning the occupancy of the claimant must be established. In addition,
some cases involve the application of Ohio Revised Code §2305.05
(11220) which specifically provides that streets and alleys on the original
plat of a municipal corporation which are never opened to public use may
be lost by adverse possession of the abutting owners.
For all of the above reasons, each case involving a municipal corpo-
ration must be determined on its own facts and by those precedents which
are particularly applicable. There is certainly no general rule that the
municipality enjoys a clear exemption from the operation of the statute.
7 Mount v. Lakeman, 21 Ohio St. 643 (1871) ; Oxford Township v. Columbia,
38 Ohio St. 87 (1881).
8 Hartman v. Hunter, Treasurer, 56 Ohio St. 175, 46 N.E. 577 (1897).
9 Ibid.
10 58 Ohio St. 410, 51 N.E. 34 (1898).
11 State ex rel. Welty, Pros. Att'y v. Ohio Nat'l Bank, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 43,
19 Ohio Dec. 82; aff'd without opinion 83 Ohio St. 449 (1910) ; State ex rel. Rulison,
Pros. Att'y v. Western German Bank, 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 543, 22 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 496; aff'd without opinion 86 Ohio St. 305 (1912).
12 25 0. JUR., Limitation of Actions §285.
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Even the plain rfile in favor of the State leaves many questions un-
answered and leaves a sizable area for statutory construction by the
courts presented with these problems. As was set out above, the American
rule is that statutes of limitation do not run against the State unless the
intentionthat they shall so run is obvious. This rule also finds expression
in the line of cases resting on the principle set out in State ex rel Parrott v.
Board of Public Works,"3 that the State is not bound by the terms of a
general statute, unless it be so expressly enacted. The question still re-
mains as to when the intention to bind the State is "obvious," or "ex-
pressly enacted."
In some cases the problem is easy, since the legislature may have
expressly limited the time in which the State's officers may act. Ohio
Revised Code §5739.16 (5546-9d), for example, limits the period within
which the tax commissioner may issue sales tax assessments. Ohio Revised
Code §323.28 (2670), an the other hand, specifically provides that no
statute of limitations shall apply in an action to sell land for delinquent
taxes and assessments. In most cases, however, the statute is silent. For
example, Ohio Revised Code §2117.12 (10509-133) provides that an
action on a claim rejected by an executor or administrator must be 6om-
menced within two months or be forever barred. No mention is made of
the State. In two cases involving this statute,14 different courts of appeal
have taken different views as to its application to the State-one court
holding that it barred an action by the Division of Aid for Aged, and
another holding that it did not. The court holding that the State was
barred, Division of A4id for Aged v. Wargo5 reasoned that the purpose
of the statute was to expedite the settlement of decedents' estates, and
that that salutary purpose could not be accomplished so long as the State
could pursue its claim after the running of the statute. Since that thought
was not "expressly enacted" the court must have taken it to be "obvious."
Such cases present problems that the citing of a legal maxim will not
solve. Each statute providing for a special period of limitation raises the
question of whether its particular problem is of such a nature that the
legislature "obviously" intended to override the State's immunity from
the operation of the statute. Without purporting to list all such examples,
attention is directed to the following statutes in which are inherent the
problem dealt with by the courts in the Marshall and Wargo cases: 6
Ohio Revised Code §2127.40 (10510-49, 10510-50) govern-
ing fraudulent conveyances made by a decedent during his
lifetime.
Is 36 Ohio St. 409 (1881).
14 Division of*Aid for Aged v. Marshall, 42 Ohio L. Abs. 131, 59 N.E. 2d 942
(1944); Division of Aid for Aged v. Wargo 48 Ohio L Abs. 47 (1947). This
opinion was followed by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County in the
case of State v. Drake, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 106 N.E. 2d 91 (1952).
i 48 Ohio L. Abs. 47, 73 N.E. 2d 942 (1944)1
16 See note 14, supra.
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Ohio Revised Code §2117.41 (10509-217, 10509-218,
10509-219) governing contingent claims that accrue after a
decedent's death.
Ohio Revised Code §1313.54 (11102) and 1313.55
(11103-1) dealing with the bulk sales law.
Ohio Revised Code §1113.10 (710-92) providing a three-
period for suits on claims rejected by the Superintendent of
Banks.
None of these statutes has been involved in a reported case involving
the State, so there are no authoritative answers as to their application.
But so long as the Wargo case, holding that the Division of Aid for Aged
is bound by the limitation set out in Ohio Revised Code §2117.12
(10509-133), remains the most authoritative expression on the subject,
the traditional rule appears to be in line for some important modifications.
Little needs to be added to the above discussion in order to cover the
application of the statute to the other sovereign in our dual system. All
that has been said about the common law rule as it has been applied in
America applies with full force to the United States. All of the cases
hold that the United States is not bound by any limitation statute, state
or federal, unless Congress has clearly expressed its intention that it should
be so bound. It is not necessary to recount the cases here, since any digest
or encyclopedia is replete with such lists."
The rule is not limited -by the fact that the United States goes into
a state court to enforce its rights. A recent case which contrasts with the
above discussion of the State's immunity is United States v. Summerlin.'8
There the Federal Housing Administrator had become the assignee of a
claim against the estate of a decedent. He filed his claim in the state
court after the statutory period of limitation had passed, and all of the
state courts held that the claim was barred. The Supreme Court reversed,
saying that the state had exceeded its powers, and that it could not bar a
claim of the United States since Congress had not assented.
While the federal courts construe the rule of sovereign immunity
strictly in favor of the government, decisions declaring a binding limitation
are not unknown. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court, Un-
excelled Chemical Corp. v. U.S."9 and U.S. v. Lindsay20 found such
]imitations in construing particular acts.2 So the problem of the lawyer
17 See, for example, 34 Am. JuR., Limitation of Actions §390-391.
18 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
19345 U.S. 59 (1953).
20 346 U.S. 568 (1954).
21 The Unexcelled Chemical case held that the two year limitation prescribed
in the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. §255) applied to a cause of action which
had accrued to the U.S. under the Walsh-Healey Act (41 U.S.C., §35d, 36). The
Lindsay case held that the six-year limitation of the Commodity Credit Act began
to run in 1945 when the defendant delivered damaged wool to the government,
even though the Act was not passed until 1948.
182 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
c9nfronfed with a federal statute is basically the same as the problem
under the state practice: can the statute be construed to indicate that Con-
gress clearly intended to include the United States within the period of
limitation.
